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THE TRIUMPH OF SPIRIT OVER LAW:
FREE WILL VERSUS DETERMINISM IN ADAM BEDE
by William H. Klein
One of the primary intellectual influences that shaped George Eliot's thought
was positivism, or rather the various influence of positivistic philosophers
such as Comte, Mill, Spencer, Feuerbach and Lewes, who each in his own
way subscribed to an empiricism dictating that knowledge of anything but
actual phenomena is impossible, and thus rejected any metaphysical speculation concerning ultimate causes or origins. This is a broad definition of
positivism, and perhaps generalizes at the expense of the fine points of the
thinkers under discussion; however, George Eliot's ultimate rejection of the
notion of a God whose existence cannot be empirically demonstrated was a
result of the belief that "that which is beyond nature, if there is anything, is
completely unknowable, and speculation about it and about the nature of
things in themselves is fruitless." 1
The process of nature as the positivists and as Eliot understood it constitutes
a system of physical laws that are universally constant and inexorable,
whereby cosmic movement is manifest whether in the cycle of the seasons or
the death of a fly. This system of natural or cosmic law is causative: each
phenomenon is the result of the interaction of countless other phenomena
receding infinitely into the past. The existence of a divine being is neither
affirmed nor denied by such a system, but it is not verifiable because it is an
ultimate cause. Yet the system does intrinsically reject the idea of a deity who
orders the universe for the sake of humanity or who "responds to men's
prayers, or compensates forinjustice ... [This] is a waking dream of the human
mind. There is no reprieve from death, and there is no forgiveness of sins;
causes are invariably followed by their effects, and once a deed is done it is
ineradicable. "2 In chapter xxvii of Adam Bede the narrator tells us:
'For if it be true that nature at certain moments seems charged
with a presentment of one individual lot, must it not also be true
that she seems unniindful, unconscious of another? For there
is no hour that has not its births of gladness and despair, no
morning brightness that does not bring new sickness to desolation as well as new forces to genius and love. There are so many
of us and our lots are so different: what wonder that Nature's
mood is often in harsh contrast with the great crisis of our
lives?'3
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Of the works of the positivist Ludwig Feuerbach, the most important to the
development of Eliot's thought was Pas Wesens des Christentums (The
Essence of Christianity), her translation of which appeared in 1857. Three
years earlier she had written to Sara Rennell: "With the ideas of Feuerbach
I everywhere agree."4 Indeed, Eliot's rejection of an omniscient Father who
doles out just punishment and reward found definition in Feuerbach' s aphorism that' 'theology long ago became anthropology.' '5 For Feuerbach, God
is merely the personification of human perfection that man has anthropomorphized and idealistically placed on the altar of his imagination:
'It is not I but religion that worships man, although religion, or
rather theology, denies it: it is not only I, an insignificant
individual, but religion itself that says: God is man, man is God
..... This is evident from the fact that religion makes God
become man and only then sets up this God that has human
form, human feeling and human thoughts as an object of its
worship and reverence. '6
Once Feuerbach has circumscribed what he believes to be the solipsism that
Christianity presents as objective and absolute truth, he points to a human
ideal attributed to God by man, one essential to the ethos of Christianity,
which according to Feuerbach alienates the human mind from complete
identification with deity: the attribute of moral perfection. In his chapter
"God as a Moral Being, Or Law," in The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach
understands the morally perfect god as "nothing else than the realized idea,
the fulfilled law of morality, the moral nature of man posited as the absolute
being,' '7 a notion following logically from the concept of God as an image of
man perfected by men. Feuerbach repudiates this morally perfect God,
however, because it forces the human heart into conflict with itself.
'This morally perfect being is no merely theoretical, inert
conception, but a practical one, calling me to action, to imitation, throwing me into strife, into disunion with myself; for
while it proclaims to me what I ought to be, it also tells· me to
my face, without any flattery, what I am not ..... Now, by what
means does man deliver himself from this state of disunion
between himself and the perfect being ... ? Only by this; that he
is conscious of love as the highest, the absolute power and truth
..... No man is sufficient for the law which moral perfection sets
before us; but for that reason, neither is the law sufficient for
man, the heart. The law gives me the consciousness that I am
worthless. The law holds man in bondage; love makes him
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free. Love is God himself and apart from it there is no God.
Love makes man God and God man. '8
The pervasive moral and philosophic perspective in all of George Eliot's
novels involves a reliance on the God oflove for humanity over and above the
love of God in the stricter sense of obedience to doctrine that is a central
element of the Judaeo-Christian tradition: the triumph of spirit over law; for
Eliot, sympathy for one's fellow man brings the individual to a greater
understanding of himself and is largely a reciprocal process. Learning to love
is the process from egoism to altruism,9 a process that Adam Bede does not
fully accomplish until he has suffered through Hetty Sorrel's incarceration
and trial. At his father's funeral in chapter xxviii he thinks to himself: "Ah,
I was always too hard ..... It's a sore fault in me as I'm so hot and out of
patience with people when they do wrong, and my heart gets shut up against
them, so as I can't bring myself to forgive 'em. I see clear there's more pride
nor love in my soul." 10 And in the next chapter, the novel's narrator, who is
often a Feuerbachian voice in both tone and point of view, tells us: "Perhaps
here lay the secret of the hardness he had accused himself of: he had too little
fellow feeling with the weakness that errs in spite of foreseen consequences.
Without this fellow feeling, how are we to get enough charity and patience
towards our stumbling, falling companions in the long and changeful journey?"ll
Through man's ability to love his fellow, Feuerbach would tell us, "man
reconciles himself with God, or rather with his own nature as represented in
the moral law." 12 As positivists, both Eliot and Feuerbach distinguish
between what Bemard Paris calls' 'moral order" and "nonmoral order" .13
Nonmoral order is that cosmic or teleologic law which acts independently of
man's will or desire. The moral order, or law, is the ethical process, manifest
in all social institutions and relationships that humanize the world. In terms
of man, the latter process has been described as the movement from moral
blindness to moral vision, the movement from egoism to altruism. However,
the moral and nonmoral orders cannot function independently of one another
according to the positivists because man is a product of empirical nature as
much if not more than his own will, and so his decisions are the result of the
interrelationship of both orders. Thus, if his decisions are determined by
nature's nonmoral order, whether in part or whole, he is not ultimately
responsible for his actions, or so Comte and Spencer assert. Then why attempt
to decide or act at all? As deterministic as Eliot's thinking was, she still
believed that we must decide, we must act, and that we can be held responsible

82

for what we do. As George Levine has suggested in his article, "Detenninism
and Responsibility in the Works of George Eliot," 14 Eliot based this belief
primarily on the refusal to comprehend the will as a causally controlled
faculty. Of course, this refusal in and of itself is an equivocation; thus, Levine
goes on to say that this evasive response to the notion of moral responsibility
in a detennined universe stems from Eliot's moral bias: "Aware of the
philosophical commonplace that no one can be obliged to do something
unless he is capable of doing it, yet feeling with equal strength the call to duty
... [as Mrs. Poyser says, "I see plain enough we shall never do without a
solution, and that's enough for me."] [Eliot] asserted the common sense point
that nothing will get done unless we make the effort and that experience tells
us we can make it." In this, Eliot, as well as Mill, has been criticized by
absolute detenninists who claim that assuming responsibility for acts that are
really the results of fixed conditions that produce "caused" or detennined
decisions is absurd, for how can the will be but the result of perception?
However, the examination of another intellectual influence that shaped
Eliot's vision, the work of Benedict de Spinoza, may help to resolve the
apparent inconsistencies in her thinking. Eliot had read Spinoza's complete
works by 1856, by which time she had also translated Spinoza's Ethics. 1s As
early as 1849 when she was translating his Theological-Political Treatise, she
wrote to Sara Hennell: "How exquisite is the satisfaction of feeling that
another mind sees precisely where and what is the difficulty."16
We should first say that, like the positivists, Spinoza also presupposes a
universe of cause and determined effect, but one major point of departure
from them is that Spinoza's universe is ontologically theistic, that is,
ultimately set in motion by God; thus, there exists a source for reality, which
Spinoza ultimately conceives of as demonstrable. According to Spinoza, the
nature of things is fixed by natural law originating in the mind of God which
detennines the material universe (natura naturata); but there is also an order
of true ideas, similar to the platonic notion of eternal fonns (natura naturans),
which is a process of thought of which man himself is capable that leads to
spontaneous and transcendant (i.e., "uncaused") decision-making and consequent responsibility on the part of the individual for his decisionsP
In On The Improvement of the Understanding, Spinoza distinguishes between "essence" (essentia or substantia) and "fiction" (fictum). These
tenns are defined axiomatically. First, let's define "essence" or what
Spinoza also calls "a true idea":
'A true idea ... is something different from its correlate (idea:
tmn); thus a circle is different from the idea of a circle. The idea
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of a circle is not something having a circumference and a
centre, as a circle has; nor is the idea of a body that body itself.
Now, as it is something different from its correlate, it is
capable of being understood through itself.... '18
This is to say that a body or object can be understood by itself (essentially) and
not by an idea or correlate representing it; when something is understood in
this fashion, it is a true idea, that is, knowing a thing~, or in and of itself,
which is understanding on the intellectual order (Kant would say this is
impossible, but that problem is beyond our present scope). If I see a chair, I
can perceive it as an object in space and time and understand its essence by
its form and function. But if I attempt to reconstruct the history of its coming
into existence, how and when it was made, for example, I am attempting a
fictive understanding because I am trying to understand the causes of the chair
in the natural order (natura naturata), something impossible since without
being a witness to its construction from scratch, I lack sufficient data. I am
thus removing the chair from its essence and connecting it to infinite and
unverifiable possibility.
There is also a sense in which the creation of fictions in the Spinozan sense
is analogous simply to jumping to conclusions, as when someone who sees a
man running down a street and at the same time hears an alarm, becomes
convinced the man is running from the alarm. In this way the individual has
seen an effect and attributed to it a fictive cause if there is no connection
between the two events. Had the individual seen the essence of the various
actions in their full continuity, that is, both separate acts of the alarm going
off and the individual running, he would not connect the events falsely, for
then he perceives the situation essentially ,just as it is possible to see the chair
in its complete physical reality, although not beyond its present state. But we
understand a chair because of its shape and use just as we understand a circle
by its roundness, and cannot separate these essential concepts one from
another. Thus the chair, circle and situation of the running man allow true
ideas of them in their essences, and not in their ontologies, or causes, which
may be impossible to determine. Spinoza tells us we cannot understand
causes in the natural order because of that order's complexity, but we can
understand essences on the intellectual plane, and, in fact, one cannot know
a thing apart from its essence, since the essence of a thing is itself the act of
knowing it. Perception equals the thing perceived. Therefore, understanding
a fiction is "feigned" or false understanding. 19
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If one can distinguish thus between fictions and essences, between knowing
something truly versus knowing it imperfectly, he is able 10 evaluate given
situations and is responsible for his actions in response to them insofar as his
understanding is accurate. The issue of accurate understanding is expressed
by Adam Bede, albeit in more concrete and homely terms. As he says in
chapter iv:
'Maybe there's a world about us as we can't see, but the ear's
quicker than the eye and catches a sound from 't now and then.
Some people think they get a sight on't too, but they're mostly
folks whose eyes are not much use to 'em at anything else. For
my part, I think it's better to see when your perpendicular's
true, than to see a ghost. '20
Adam here distinguishes between understanding essence and fiction. Although specifically referring to the supernatural, his comment on ghosts may
be interpreted as his rejection of trying to understand effects without causes,
just as "seeing when your perpendicular's true" refers to understanding a
thing essentially in and of itself. In fact, his tendency 10 think in metaphors
of carpentry throughout the novel with an emphasis on axiomatic expressions
is a more general indication of his understanding of essence: "Whenever
Adam was strongly convinced of a proposition, it took the form of a principle
in his mind: it was knowledge to be acted on, as much as the knowledge that
damp will cause rust.' '21 Although Adam does condemn himself, and is
condemned by Mr. Irwine, for overly formulaic thinking - in part suffering
from what Nietzsche would call an overdose of "moralic acid" - Eliot still
affirms that Adam's understanding of things in principle is practical wisdom
and knowledge to be implemented. That is, it is only with as full an
understanding of truth as possible can one approach making the right
decisions, and one is responsible for them in relation to the fullness of that
understanding. There is also the sense in which true understanding in
Spinoza's terms is transcendent of the natural order of objects and events
entirely, the grasp of an object or idea in its autonomous reality, which may
well form the basis of Eliot's refusal to comprehend the will as causally
controlled, and her refusal in this light may be understood as a philosophical
viewpoint and not an equivocation.
Of course, Adam's vision, which is a paradigm against which the insight of
the other characters is weighed, is tempered by fictions as well. His "blended
susceptibility and self-command,' '22 his ability to grasp certain things fully
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and still misapprehend the causes of others, most notably in his mistaken
notion of Hetty's motives in her liaison with Arthur Donnithorne, is what
causes the suffering that brings him to a greater understanding of the
difference between truth and fiction by the end of the novel, and that
understanding is what makes him a more responsible being (in the most
common sense of the word, one is responsible only in so far as he understands
the consequences of his actions). As Irwine tells Adam in chapter xli:
'We sometimes form our judgment on what seems strong
evidence, and yet, for want of knowing some small fact, our
judgment is wrong. But suppose the worst: you have no right
to say that the guilt of her crimes lies with him, and that he ought
to bear the punishment. It is not for us men to apportion the
shares of moral guilt and retribution .... You have a mind that
can understand this fully, Adam, when you are calm ... if you
were to obey your passion [in avenging Hetty] - for it is passion
and you deceive yourself in calling it justice - it might be with
you as it has been with Arthur; nay, worse; your passion might
lead you yourself into a horrible crime.'23
Irwine's hesitancy to impute evil may be seen as a synthesis of the capacity
to distinguish essence from fiction on the one hand, and the Feuerbachian
concept of love on the other. As we've discussed, Feuerbach asserts that
Christianity invariably forces us to downgrade our fellow man on the absolute
scale of moral perfection, since, in anthropomorphizing God, man has deified
himself without realizing that he lacks the perfection and omniscience to
assume the role. This lack of omniscience is another way of looking at man's
inability to understand fictions which would become essences if he were
clearly to see ultimate causes, which is transcendent understanding, and
which would put man in the position of godhead; although it should be noted
that according to Spinoza such ultimate understanding in the natural order is
impossible. However, to return to the Feuerbachian problem of man's selfdeification, when man does so, if unconsciously, he passes moral judgement
on his fellows, which is a reciprocal function of self-deification, or egoism,
and in so doing he jumps to conclusions, mistakes the part for the whole, the
fiction for the true idea, as Irwine implies. Moreover, it is only through love,
says Feuerbach, through what Spinoza calls union with God or the Divine
Substance or Essence,24 that we can be freed of human bondage to unhappiness, and this freedom involves an acceptance of one's own limitations in
order to understand the limitations of humanity in general. If we know
ourselves, we can know others, and to know, both Eliot, Feuerbach and
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Spinoza would concur, is to forgive, as well as to love God.
Of course, Eliot's acceptance of the ethical process throughout her novels is
couched in esthetic naturalism and abides with a keen didacticism as well as
good common sense, so she is thus inclined towards the realistic if mildly
tragic view that altruism can only be arrived at through suffering. Her concept
of nemesis is not directly relevant to this discussion, but few would argue the
point that experience is the best teacher. It is experience that generates in
Adam what Reva Stump has characterized as the positive movement in the
novel, the movement towards moral vision;25 it is what changes Dinah Morris
in a less precisely articulated fashion, what seems to bring Arthur out of his
egoism by the novel's end, and it is what destroys Hetty. In light of what
happens to the characters and why, at least if we accept the fact that Hetty has
less capacity for understanding than, say, Adam, as Eliot says she does
(although her potential for insight and change is not a moot point), how are
we to hold her responsible for what she does? Absolute determinists contend
that, despite our potential for free will, we remain defined by our natures;
thus, how can we blame the irresponsible man for poor judgment or action,
which would be tantamount to blaming the blind for their blindness or the
circle for being round. According to Spinoza and, by implication, Eliot, we
cannot. We may say that a man is responsible for his actions in so far as he
appreciates their consequences, which is not unlike the legal definition of
sanity, but it would be a far more complex issue to determine such degree of
character outside of a novel or play. The issue may be restated as the problem
of measuring the ability of someone to foresee his fate; as Irwine says: "Our
deeds determine us as much as we determine our deeds, and until we know
what has been or will be the peculiar combination of outward with inward
facts, which constitute a man's critical actions, it will be better not to think
ourselves too wise about his character."26
Although the kind of individual who is capable of expanding his vision of
truth is closer to the paradigm of Adam Bede than, let us say, Hetty Sorrell,
as we have presented the model, this discussion has attempted to show how
the individual human mind, although, almost needless to say, determined by
certain factors, can nevertheless come to a greater understanding of life
through a process that transcends certain natural or determining causes, a
process largely dependent on the reciprocity of self and experience, although
innate sensitivity to the process is necessary as well. We have then suggested
that insofar as an individual is capable of accomplishing this process, he may
be deemed conscious of his decisions and actions, and is therefore respon87

sible, if not for the ultimate consequences of his actions, then at least for
having initiated them. The issue of absolute determinism and its belief that
nature is unalterable cannot really be addressed if only because all ultimatums
are unanswerable by definition, and are not implicitly relevant in what both
Bemard Paris and Eliot have characterized as the web of experience, a phrase
denoting the relativity and complexity of cause and effect. That web is so
limitlessly complex that. as Irwine says,
'we find it impossible to avoid mistakes in determining who has
committed a single criminal act, and the problem of how far a
man is to be held responsible for the unseen consequences of
his own deed, is one that might well make us tremble to look
into it. The evil consequences that lie folded in a single act of
selfish indulgence is a thought so awful that it ought surely to
awaken some feeling less presumptuous than a rash desire to
punish?7
That feeling is love and forgiveness and more, the triumph of spirit over law,
for here Eliot has stated through her mouthpiece the central element of the
Christian ethos that transcends the need to be labelled a religious doctrine at
all, and is no more nor less than righteous kindness.
In Adam Bede, as in all her major novels, George Eliot recreates life with an
incisive eye not merely for realistic detail, but with an acute awareness of the
complexity and ambiguity of moral experience. Adam Bede is a richly
painted portrait of rural life to which is appended the caption of intellectual
and moral understanding, and the difficulties of her vivid world brightly
reflect ours. Her neighbours, friends, lovers, and enemies are ours and we see
ourselves in the mirror of her mind; so in the novel's epigraph Wordsworth
echoes the difficulty oflove and forgiveness in a clumsy and imperfect world:
And when
I speak of such among my flock as swerved
Or fell, those only shall be singled out
Upon whose lapse, or error, something more
Than brotherly forgiveness may attend.
That "something more" is for both Eliot and Wordsworth the possibility of
increased moral awareness through example and experience, since forgiveness is useless if the giver proffers it blindly and the taker learns nothing from
accepting it. In Adam Bede, George Eliot presents us with the difficulties of
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such blindness and vision recreating the ideas of her beloved philosophers in
novel fonn, attempting to resolve the problems they pose by presenting their
abstractions in tenns of character and situation that reflect our own lives and
the lives of those around us, whom the web of experience has inextricably
bound to our actions and our hearts.
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Editor's note:

The above article was the winner of the Gordon Ray
Prize at New York University for the best essay on a Vic-

torian novelist submitted in the Spring of 1989.
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